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QUALITY OF FOREIGN LOANS INITIATED BY INDIVIDUAL
BANKING HOUSES
To supplement our analysis of the decline in foreign loan quality
by borrowing countries we examine the different and changing
attitudes of individual banking houses. Classifying loans according
to issuing houses will again test the diffusion of credit deterioration
and provide some clues to the forces responsible for this process.
The bankers who testified in 193 1-32 at the Senate hearings on
foreign lending were requested to file information on their loans,
primarily with a view to ascertaining their profits. The records
prepared for this purpose by 11 New York banking houses form
the basis of our investigation. They were often hurriedly prepared
at short notice; moreover, they were not organized in a uniform
fashion. Still, these lists do roughly describe the role of individual
banking houses in originating foreign loans and this is our only
purpose in using them. It must be stressed that our study refers in
no sense to the financial success of the various investment houses.
Issuing a loan does not imply holding any part of it; and a banker
who has not initiated a loan may very well have underwritten it.'
Of the bond issues reported by the bankers we include those
covered in our sample B (which excludes Canada). About 90
percent of the total amount of issues in sample B —$5billion of
loans —arereported by the 11 banking houses.
'The usual procedure in floating foreign loans was as follows: The borrower
as vendor sold an issue of securities to an American banking house, the origi-
nating or issuing house. The originating house either marketed the entire
issue itself, or, more commonly, associated itself with one or several other
investment houses, forming a buying or underwriting syndicate. The partici-
pants in such a syndicate "do not actually purchase the securities, but instead
underwrite them. That is, they guarantee or really insure the sale of an issue
by agreeing to an arrangement whereby the unsold balance of an issue is taken
over" (G. W. Edwards, Investing in Foreign Securities, Ronald Press, 1926,
pp. 110-1).
The original house usually managed the syndicate it had organized. The
underwriting syndicate disposed of the securities to the distributing syndicate,
a large association including possibly hundreds of participants, which in turn
offered the bonds to the public.
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The statistical data presented in this chapter are not as trust-
worthy as those presented in earlier chapters. They are based on
less reliable compilations, as indicated afrve, and they do not
cover all issuing houses. Furthermore, the lending of each banking
house is, of course, only a fraction of lending, and as the
number of observations becomes smaller, measurements are more
affected by special factors which tended to cancel out when all
loans were treated as a whole. Thus the findings of this chapter
must be taken as rough approximations. Yet for all their limita-
tions the results are surprisingly stable the story they tell seems
so reasonable that they are well worth studying.2
Arraying the 11 investment houses in the order of the soundness
of the loans they originated we get the results shown in Table 11
(for definitions of 'sound' and 'defaulted' loans see Ch. 2). The
differences in the activity and judgment of individual banking
houses are striking. The wide range of the default indexes is the
more remarkable as the "responsible and prudent issuing houses
are liable to be blacklegged in negotiating their business and
As an experiment we added first Canadian, then private corporate loans to
our sample. The results were essentially the same as those shown below.
Table 11





iiousn ($ million) (%)
1 323 43 13
2 1,680 232 14
3 377 100 27
4 314 103 33
5 832 397 48
6 468 338 72
7 157 126 80
8 233 227 97
9 294 284 97
10 133 131 98
11 157 157 100
A Group (1-2) 2,003 275 14
B Group (3-5) 1,523 600 39
C Group (6-11) 1.442 1,263 88
Total 4,968 2,138 4356 CHAPTER 4
to have sound transactions made unsound by subsequent extrava-
gance".3 When the banking houses are grouped by their default
indexes it turns out that Group A, the initiators of $2 billions of
loans, assessed risks so well that only 14 percent of their issues went
to borrowers who defaulted; but more than one-third of the issues
of Group B, which initiated $1.5 billion of loans, and almost nine-
tenths of the nearly $1.5 billion initiated by Group C proved
unsound. To put it differently: only 13 percent of defaulted loans
stemmed from bankers who originated 40 percent of all loans,
while 59 percent stemmed from bankers who issued only 29 per-
cent of all loans.
Though equality was not to be expected in view of the different
characters of investment houses and the role of chance, the range
of default indexes for individual banking houses, 13-100 percent,
is astonishing. Evidently the factors determining the quality of
credit were not of uniform importance for all bankers. Some issu-
ing houses must have been almost immune to the forces which
caused the deterioration of credit. Others, on the contrary, were
utterly under their sway.
Are the differences between banking houses due to the different
timing of their loans?' That is, did those with a low default index
extend loans primarily in the early period, and those with a high
default index in the late period? Or does a low default index mean
that a banking house lent wisely throughout the period and a high
one that it made serious mistakes all the time?
Table 12 reveals that the decline in loan quality was widely
diffused. The default index of only 1 of the 11 banking houses
did not decline. This makes the rise in the general default index
more meaningful and strongly supports our interpretation of it as
a gauge of credit deterioration.
The timing of the loans and their outcome were closely related.
The more the lending of a banking house was concentrated in
the second half of the period the more unfavorable the result (col.
3 and 4)Ofthe four most careful lenders two lent less after
Salter, op. Cit., p. 123.
'The coefficient of rank correlation between the degree to which loans were
concentrated in the second period (col. 3) and the default index (col. 4) is .92.LOANS BY INDIVIDUAL BANKING HOUSES 57
Table 12
Timing and Quality of Foreign Government Bond Issues Initiated
by 11 Banking Houses
RATIO:
Loans 1925-30
AMOUNT OF to Loans
LOANS INITIATED 1920-30 DEFAULT INDEX
($million) (percentages)
1920-1920-1925-
BANKING HOUSE1920-241 925-30 30 24 30
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 150 173 54 13 0 25
2 869, 811 48 14 15 12
3 213 164 44 27 0 .61
4 147 167 53 33 0 62
5 311 521 63 48 8 71
6 188 280 60 72 57 82
7 37 120 76 80 62 86
8 39 194 83 97 85 100
9 6 288 98 97 99
10 0 133 100 98 .... 98
11 0 157 100 100 .... 100
A Group (1-2) 1,019 984 49 14 13 14
B Group (3-5) 671 852 56 39 4 67
C Group (6-11) 270 1,172 81 88 61 94
Total 1,960 3,008 61 43 17 60
*This firmdidnot issue a loan until 1926 except for a single issue in 1920. In
this case, it would be pointless to speak of a default index of zero for 1920-24.
Therefore we disregard this loan here and in the discussion of the default
indexes for 1920-24.
1924 than before; the other two lent only slightly more. At the
other end of the scale are the three banking houses with the worst
records which went into foreign lending only in 1925 or later.
Evidently, when the more cautious bankers refrained from expand-
ing their loans, their place. was taken by the more careless ones.
As the latter did a larger share of total lending the average quality
of loans declined. The rise in the average default index is in part
attributable to the changed structure of the lending community.
But the big variations in the fate of loans initiated by the 11
banking houses are by no means due entirely to their different
timing. The range of default indexes in the early and in the late
period is as wide as for the period as a whole: from 0 to 85 per-
cent for the first period, from 12 to 100 percent for the second
(Table 12, col. 5 and 6). We have banking houses with 'good' and
'bad' results in every subperiod as well as during the period as a58 CHAPTER 4
whole and, what is more interesting, a bank's relative position
among its colleagues —asfar as the quality of its foreign lending
was concerned —remainedmuch the same.5 The five issuing
houses with the best record made practically no mistakes in the
first period. The default index of four rises considerably in the
second period; but not one becomes as high as those of the three
firms that had a high percentage of mistakes already in the early
period.0
The parallelism of the ratios in columns 3-6 suggests that each
individual banking house had a definite attitude with respect to
this part of its business, an attitude that determined the quality
as well as the timing of its loans. This parallelism is even more
striking when we consider the aforementioned influence of random
forces.
Thus from the viewpoint of the role of individual issuing houses
the rise in the total default index may be regarded as the resultant
of two processes. The first is a decline in the quality of loans ex-
tended by the individual banking house; this alone would account
for an increase in the total default index from 17 percent in the
early period to 41 percent in the late period.7 The actual index
for the late period was 60 percent, however, and the remaining
part' of the increase is explained by the second factor, the shift in
the role of individual banks, the greater proportion of loans origi-
nated by less careful or less competent houses.
The same forces are responsible for both factors. Whatever
induces a cautious banker to grant riskier loans will still more
encourage a less cautious one to expand his lending and will attract
new firms to such ventures. An analysis of these forces will be
attempted in Chapter 6.
The coefficient of rank correlation between the default indexes for the early
and those for the late period is .74.
Banking house 2 is the only one of the 11 whose default index does not rise in
the second period. Its only defaulted loans were the Dawes and Young loans
in 1924 and 1930; in 1926, 1927, and 1928, the years when most of the de-
faulted loans were made, it issued about half a billion dollars of foreign
government bonds; not one of these was a failure.
Computed by applying default indexes of the late period to the amounts of
loans issued in the early period.